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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PANEL 
UNPACKING JEVIC: AN ATTEMPT TO PUT THE 




Monique D. Hayes∗∗∗∗ 
MR. MAHER: Hello, everyone. My name is Patrick Maher. I’m the Executive 
Symposium Editor for the EBDJ. I have the distinct pleasure of introducing 
today’s Corporate Panel. First, I have a couple of administrative things. 
Number one, parking vouchers. On your way out at the tables that you 
checked in at, we have parking vouchers, so if you drove here today and 
parked we have a voucher for you. We also have an EBDJ commemorative 
tote bag for our guests. Please look to the right when you go out the doors. 
These are for our esteemed guests today. 
Without further ado, I will present our second topic. The topic is Jevic. The 
Supreme Court’s ruling last year that raises as many questions as it answers, 
continues to be batted about in the lower courts and deals with a lot of topics: 
structured dismissals, critical vendor theory, DIP rollups, absolute priority, and 
a lot of other matters that run the gamut of chapter 11. 
To my right is Leah Fiorenza McNeill. She is an associate in Bryan Cave’s 
Bankruptcy, Restructuring, and Creditors’ Rights Group. She graduated from 
Mercer University School of Law in 2009 and the University of Georgia in 
2006. Her restructuring and bankruptcy experience includes representation of 
distressed companies, chapter 7 trustees, chapter 11 trustees, creditors’ 
committees, and secured and unsecured creditors. She also represents lenders, 
financial institutions, and businesses in complex finance disputes including 
loan defaults, real estate transactions, and breach of contract claims. Leah is 
also a contributing editor to Norton’s Bankruptcy Law and Practice, the 
leading treatise in her field, and she contributed a new chapter entitled 
Depositions. 
                                                     
 ∗ Associate, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP. 
 ∗∗ Associate, Bryan Cave. 
 ∗∗∗ Partner, Whiteford Taylor & Preston, LLP. 
 ∗∗∗∗ Partner, Goldstein & McClintock LLLP. 
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To her right is Katie Good. Katie Good is a partner at Whiteford Taylor 
and Preston’s, Wilmington, Delaware office. She is an Emory Law alum and 
EBDJ alum. She also graduated from the University of North Carolina Chapel 
Hill in 2003. She regularly represents debtors, secured lenders, committees, 
asset purchasers, liquidation trusts, and other parties in chapter 11 cases as well 
as foreign representatives and other parties in chapter 13 ancillary proceedings. 
Katie regularly litigates in bankruptcy court as well as in appeals courts, before 
federal district courts and courts of appeals. She has also represented 
companies in successful out-of-court restructuring and prepackaged and 
prearranged bankruptcy cases. In addition, Katie has substantial experience 
with substantive non-consolidation options for structured finance transactions. 
To her right is Monique Hayes. Monique is a partner at Goldstein & 
McClintock in Miami, Florida. She focuses her areas of practice on business 
transactions, commercial litigation, and corporate restructuring. She has 
extensive experience advising fiduciaries, corporate and nonprofit board 
members, entrepreneurs and small businesses. Monique has successfully 
represented clients in a broad range of matters including asset sales and 
acquisitions, finance transactions, bankruptcy plan confirmation, avoidance 
actions, directors and officer claim litigation, Ponzi scheme and other fraud 
litigation. She has substantial experience representing franchisors in franchise 
bankruptcy proceedings, and in the innovation and technology sector Monique 
has represented startups, entrepreneurs and founders of separate foundation 
and restructuring due diligence and related transactional matters. She received 
her JD from the University of Miami School of Law, and her undergraduate 
degree from the University of South Florida. 
To her right is Alex Dugan. Alex is an associate at Bradley Arant Boult 
Cummings in Nashville, Tennessee. She is also an Emory Law and EBDJ 
alum, so we welcome her back to campus today as well. She graduated from 
Emory Law in 2011 and from Vanderbilt with her BA in 2008. Alex regularly 
represents financial services and mortgage company clients with compliance 
matters. Her practice focuses on the bankruptcy compliance and regulatory 
concerns that her clients face. Her practice also includes representation of 
debtors and creditors in chapter 11 cases, out-of-court workouts, 
reorganizations, restructurings and liquidations. She wrote the first substantive 
piece on Jevic in the nation which was then picked up and cited by the Loan 
Syndication and Trading Association, which is a leading trade group. She is 
also a regular monthly contributor to the Norton Bankruptcy Law Advisor. 
Please join me in welcoming the Corporate Panel. 
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MS. FIORENZA: Thank you, Patrick, and thank you all for being here. I’d 
also like to thank Emory and the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal for 
allowing us to speak today on this issue. We will be discussing Jevic, which is 
a Supreme Court case decision that happened almost a year ago, and its effects 
on chapter 11 practice already, and its effects on chapter 11 practice in the 
future. 
I will first provide a very brief summary of Jevic, a summary of Jevic that 
should help whether you’ve read Jevic ten times or if you’ve never read it, 
which I will say if you haven’t read Jevic, I would highly recommend you do 
so. Then we will open up the panel and we will discuss a number of topics 
today, and we’ll discuss the issues that these practitioners, my co-panelists, 
have experienced in their districts, and then also what we expect will change in 
chapter 11 practice coming in the future. 
So now for the brief summary of Jevic. So, for me to make Jevic incredibly 
simple, although it’s not a simple case and it’s certainly not a simple opinion, 
but to make it simple for me, I focus on the parties and the parties’ roles. There 
are five relevant parties of Jevic. There’s the debtor and the debtor affiliates, 
and that’s what I’ll call Jevic, and then there is the Sun Capital which is the 
equity holder and junior lender of Jevic. This is important because not only 
was Sun Capital the equity holder due to a leveraged buyout that occurred 
about two years before Jevic filed for bankruptcy, but it also had a junior lien 
which was fully secured by $1.7 million of the estate’s assets. So we’ll talk 
about the estate’s assets in a minute. But it’s important to know that they were 
equity holder and were fully secured in this $1.7 million. 
The third party is CIT Group, and they were the secured lender. The fourth 
party was the group of truck drivers. So the truck drivers were Jevic’s 
employees, and these employees were laid off when the company was wound 
down, right around the time the company filed for chapter 11. They filed a 
WARN Act violation claim against the Jevic estates and also against Sun 
Capital, the equity holder. The truck driver employees got an $8.3 million 
judgment against the Jevic estate, as such, these truck driver employees had a 
priority wage claim in this bankruptcy. Something that we’ll also discuss later 
is the truck driver employees also had an approximately $3.1 million general 
unsecured claim as well. 
The fifth and final party is the unsecured creditors committee. An 
unsecured creditors committee in this case was given the right to file a 
fraudulent transfer claim action on behalf of the estate against Sun Capital, the 
equity holder, and CIT which was the secured lender. The reason for bringing 
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the fraudulent transfer action was because of the LBO that occurred in 2006. 
And the theory is that the LBO rendered the company insolvent. 
Back to the $1.3 million. Once Jevic’s chapter 11 was filed and the 
liquidation was ongoing, the estate essentially had two assets. It had the 
fraudulent transfer claim which the committee was bringing, and then it also 
had the $1.7 million in cash. But remember the cash was encumbered by the 
equity holder, Sun Capital’s, lien. At that point there was no argument whether 
Jevic was administratively insolvent or not. Jevic had professional fees, it had 
administrative expense claims, it had the Jevic employee wage priority claim, 
and then it also had some priority tax claims, and then the general unsecured 
creditors pool. Not enough money to go around by any means. 
About three years after Jevic filed its chapter 11, four out of the five parties 
got creative. Those four parties are Jevic the debtor, the equity holder Sun 
Capital, CIT which is the secured creditor, and the committee. They came to an 
agreement, a structured dismissal and settlement agreement, that allowed for 
payment. It’s much more complicated than this, but for today what essentially 
happened was CIT, the secured lender, agreed to put $2 million in, Sun Capital 
agreed to waive its liens on the $1.7 million of the estate cash, and they agreed 
that the professionals, some of the administrative expenses, the tax priority tax 
claims, and then the general unsecured creditors pool would get paid out. And 
it would filter down, skip over the truck driver employee wage claims, and go 
to the general unsecured pool. I think there was a 4 cents on the dollar 
distribution. 
The interesting thing here as well, remember the truck drivers not only had 
the employee wage claim but they also had the general unsecured claim. But 
the structured dismissal settlement agreement required that not only the 
employee truck drivers not get paid on their $8.3 million priority wage claim, 
but they also were carved out of the unsecured creditors’ distribution. So they 
literally were carved out of this deal 100%.  
Obviously it goes in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court 
approves it over the objection of the truckers employees and also the U.S. 
Trustee. It was appealed, went to district court and the Third Circuit, and they 
both upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision. Then in front of the Supreme 
Court it was overruled. The Supreme Court’s ruling is narrow, although it has 
had effects, as you will hear later today, a lot more effects than we would have 
expected since it is so narrow. 
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the holding essentially says a bankruptcy court cannot approve a structured 
dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority 
rules without consent when a structured dismissal is an end-of-case 
distribution. So the important things to remember here are priority skipping 
and end-of-case distribution. 
So on that note, I’m actually going to start our first question for today, and 
Alex, I’m going to have you kick this off. Is there any further guidance we can 
glean from the dissent in the Supreme Court’s opinion? 
MS. DUGAN: So I think there is, and before I jump into that, if you all will 
just indulge me for a minute down memory lane. It was in this auditorium 
several years ago when I started Emory where we had kind of like a kickoff to 
the classes, and we sat in here and I think we’d read some tort case. The whole 
purpose of the session was to talk about the importance of holdings and 
whether they were narrow or broad, and in fact even if they were narrow, how 
much you could extend them. So I remember this one specifically was like a 
tort case and the question was, what is the holding? Is it an eight-year-old boy 
who gets a head injury at a train track? Is that all this case stand for? Or is it 
any person in the continental U.S. who gets any injury? How far or how 
narrow do they extend? 
I think that there are many things about Jevic that are very interesting and 
you could have a very long conversation about, but I think the that is the one 
that’s very applicable here and I think that’s a theme that will keep coming up 
in our discussions today. But to actually go back and answer your question, 
Leah, yes, there was a dissent in Jevic. Justices Alito and Thomas did dissent, 
they went back and they said, look, the thing is—what e granted cert on—was  
this specific question: Whether the bankruptcy court may authorize 
distributions of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory 
priority scheme.  
So that was the question that was before the Supreme Court. However, 
when the truckers filed their opening brief, they were presented with a much 
more narrow and specific question, and that one was whether a chapter 11 case 
may be terminated by a structured dismissal that distributes estate property in 
violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. So I think the two major 
differences and narrowing here are the inclusion of structured dismissal as well 
as a specific focus on estate property. 
Those are two main things that Justices Alito and Thomas talked about in 
their dissent, and they called this an impermissible bait and switch, which I 
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thought was an interesting choice of terms. But the first was they said, look, 
this is essentially not something we want to encourage future litigants to take 
this kind of path where you present one question but then at the end of the day 
you try and push another question through. Then the second piece was that 
they said this really is a novel area of law. There’s a lot of case law percolating 
in the lower courts and appellate courts on structured dismissals, and since this 
is a relatively new concept with a lot of activity going on, it’s probably one 
that may have warranted further activity before we took it up. 
MS. FIORENZA: Maybe it would help actually if we could just talk briefly 
about the benefits of structured dismissal before jumping into all the topics. 
Katie, I was hoping that maybe you could kick this one off. 
MS. GOOD: Absolutely. So what is a structured dismissal and why would 
someone take this avenue rather than the other avenues out of chapter 11? 
Those other avenues out of chapter 11 would be confirming through chapter 11 
plan, converting your case to chapter 7, or going with a straightforward plain 
vanilla dismissal of the case. The structured dismissal is a construct that came 
about, I think, starting in the mid-2000s, mid to late 2000s. It was presented as 
a cheaper and more efficient alternative than either a chapter 11 liquidating 
plan or a chapter 7 conversion. 
It usually provides for distribution of estate assets. The idea is that if you 
converted the case to chapter 7, a chapter 7 trustee would have to come in, 
they’d have to get up to speed. That would take additional time. They would 
have to do their own investigation. That would take more time and cost more 
money, and it would just be more efficient to distribute funds directly. But at 
the same time the tension that was coming up in these cases is quite often there 
just wasn’t the time or the money to confirm a chapter 11 plan. In a traditional 
chapter 11 plan, you’ve got to file your plan, you’ve got a minimum of 28 days 
until your disclosure statement hearing, and usually that ends up being a little 
bit more like 35 by the time you build in time for objection deadlines and 
service. Then you have your disclosure statement approval hearing and you’re 
looking at what’s really a minimum of 28 but, in reality, another 35 to 40 days 
to get to your confirmation hearing before you can start the distribution 
process, and all the while you’re incurring U.S. Trustee fees—which have now 
recently gone up under the new laws—and those aren’t cheap. You’re 
incurring fees for your professionals and just the everyday burn of keeping a 
liquidating debtor alive. 
So structured dismissals were presented as this way that was sort of cheap 
and easy and quick. They sometimes, but not always, were utilized as a 
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mechanism to achieve class skipping, which is what was happening in the 
Jevic structured dismissal. They also included other bells and whistles that you 
wouldn’t see in a normal chapter 11 dismissal such as release and exculpation 
provisions, a claims process and distribution process, carve-outs or gift trusts, 
conditions on the dismissal, and provisions regarding the enforceability of 
prior orders that would run afoul of the standard of returning to the status quo 
entity in a basic dismissal.  
MS. FIORENZA: So I hear two things. I hear that bankruptcy is expensive, 
and that structured dismissals were almost like a mini-plan. So, Monique, 
could you tell us what is it that makes bankruptcy so expensive? 
MS. HAYES: Well, when I think of all the time and money that I spent 
becoming a bankruptcy professional, I don’t think it’s unwarranted in terms of 
the costs associated to the practice, but there is this narrative in the industry 
that bankruptcy is unduly expensive. But I would push back on that narrative, 
and I think it’s important for the professionals in our industry to take people to 
task when they’re making this assertion because not only does it do injustice to 
our practice, but it also affects the constituents, the businesses and the 
consumers that we seek to serve in this industry. This is because inside the 
bankruptcy process there is a lot of leverage and opportunities under the law 
that are not otherwise available for resolving financial difficulties.  
So in the short answer I would say that bankruptcy is as expensive as it 
needs to be to get to a necessary resolution. However, the alternative is much 
more expensive for all parties involved, the debtor that may be saddled with 
debt, the creditors that may be unable to otherwise recover on that debt, and 
then the administrative process that’s overburdened when it’s not an orderly 
administration of a debt process. So I would push back on the sense and the 
narrative that bankruptcy is too expensive.  
But as it relates to Jevic, I think that we need to be cognizant of the fact 
that with respect to structured dismissals, there were very savvy professionals 
that do what bankruptcy lawyers do all of the time, and what they do is come 
into a difficult situation and craft a creative solution that gets to a result that is 
acceptable to most parties, all the while bearing equity at the forefront. So 
that’s generally the context within which we see plans, and then outside of 
plans, where they are not feasible for whatever the circumstances would be, 
you have structures created in order to give effect to a resolution. And so that’s 
what happens. 
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In the Jevic case, the issue came up that, there’s a phrase that if you’re not 
at the table you’re on the menu. And that’s kind of what played out in the Jevic 
case. The whole point in bankruptcy is to get as many people at the table as 
possible so that you can have an equitable resolution, and leverages are tilted 
and shifted throughout a bankruptcy case in order to get to that point. In Jevic, 
the truck drivers who in all other circumstances would have been the 100-
pound elephant in the room understanding what the WARN Act is. When I 
clerked for a bankruptcy judge it was in the early 2000s, and that was right 
after a great mass of WARN Act litigation.  
Just to bring it to the forefront to make sure that everyone understands 
what the WARN Act is, it’s another federal statute. So anytime you have any 
federal law, it could be the Internal Revenue Code, it could be just general 
frauds that we heard about in the prior panel under the CFPB, or any another 
federal statute. Anytime there’s a juxtaposition of the Bankruptcy Code versus 
another federal statute, you want to pay particular attention. With respect to the 
WARN Act, the rule is that for general employers, it could be a small business 
or it could be a large business, if you have in excess of 50 employees, you have 
the obligation to warn them in advance if they’re going to be fired and give 
them a certain amount of notice. And that law is a federal statute, and when 
you’re in the bankruptcy context, it’s almost sacrosanct. So when you’re at the 
table, when you’re cutting up the pie or distributing the pot you want to have in 
the forefront of your mind who you’re going to distribute to, and you don’t 
want to run afoul of another federal statute.  
In the Jevic case, they ran afoul of that federal statute, the federal statute 
being the WARN Act. The debtor had not warned its employees about them 
being fired with sufficient notice. As a result of their failure to warn, these 
truck drivers had a huge claim that they stood to recover on in the bankruptcy 
process. But rather than pay out on those claims, the deal was cut that left these 
truck drivers out. And so we came to a point where you have to deal with the 
consequences of that deal that was struck without the truck drivers at the table. 
MS. GOOD: I think it’s important to note for those who may have not read 
Jevic, the reason that they were left out is they brought those WARN Act 
claims not only against the debtor but also against their equity holder, Sun 
Capital who has a lien on all of the debtor’s assets. So the reason that a chapter 
7 conversion wasn’t going to produce a result here, and I think part of the 
reason that the lower courts approved the structured dismissal and affirmed 
that decision all the way up through the Third Circuit is that because the 
WARN Act suit was against not only the debtor but also Sun Capital, and Sun 
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Capital now has a lien on all of the remaining assets, Sun Capital was 
unwilling to reach a settlement that would provide funds to the WARN 
claimants that they could continue to pursue their litigation against Sun 
Capital. 
So if the case were to have just converted, a chapter 7 trustee would’ve 
been left with litigation that Sun’s liens could have potentially attached to any 
remaining assets, and so they wouldn’t have had necessarily the pot of funds to 
go after the litigation that they settled with the creditors committee. So that’s 
why the bankruptcy court and the district court and Third Circuit looking at 
this, I think, said, okay, the structured dismissal isn’t ideal but it’s making the 
best of a bad situation because if this case converts it’s very possible, almost 
certain that no one gets anything else. 
MS. FIORENZA: And just as a quick side note, the WARN Act litigation 
against Sun Capital was concluded in the recent past, and Sun Capital actually 
won that litigation. So that’s kind of interesting. 
So is Jevic a victory for the small guys or the lenders? 
MS. HAYES: I think on its face, the Jevic Supreme Court decision was a 
victory for the small guys, meaning the truck drivers took the matter all the 
way up to the Supreme Court. They were left out of the deal. The Supreme 
Court declared that that was not proper because it ran afoul of the statutory 
priority system that the Code sets forth, and because they had not been granted 
consent, they did not give consent for this treatment of their claims under the 
deal structure. And so the deal had to be undone essentially. So they won in 
that sense. But it’s possible to win the battle and then lose the war. And in this 
case that is what happened to the truck drivers. Not ultimately because the 
litigation is still going to play on, and there are various avenues that are yet to 
be determined in the case, but overall where we find ourselves is that the funds 
that were currently available to make distributions to creditors are gone 
because the asset was controlled by the lien. There was no invalidation of the 
lien of the secured creditors. So once the deal was taken away and the 
distribution was lost, that opportunity to access those funds outside of litigating 
was also lost. And the litigation is to a point where the recoveries and the cost 
of pursuing that litigation beyond, and then on multiple appeals, almost makes 
it impossible to reach a resolution. 
The other issue that I’m more concerned about is this decision. It creates 
the possibility of increased silos and negotiation in the bankruptcy process. 
There has always been a concern that negotiations in bankruptcy oftentimes 
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leave out certain parties, and there are silos. The issue with Jevic is that it 
presents the possibility that people may try to reach deals even before the 
leverage—that the priority structure would create in the bankruptcy—is able to 
be obtained. What that means is that the secured creditors may reach a deal 
with the debtor well before the case is even filed, and so that’s before the 
WARN Act claims are ever at issue. And then those same employees may 
never get to the point of being able to have bankruptcy-based claims and 
litigation that they could pursue. 
So I don’t like to use really hot button terms, but it could be collusive. That 
is the concern a lot of times about the deals that are being struck. There is a 
perception of collusion, and there is now a reality that there may be deals that 
have been struck in order to specifically evade the bankruptcy laws. 
MS. FIORENZA: So do we think that Jevic is going to create more litigation? 
MS. DUGAN: I would say yes, and I think a couple of things. I think it will 
certainly cost a lot of money in a lot of ways to try and figure out what does 
Jevic really mean and what are the downstream effects going to be. I think that, 
like we’ve talked about before, it is a very narrow holding, but there are 
already a lot of instances in courts of how it can be applied more broadly. 
One of the things that I find so interesting about chapter 11 practice is that 
I think there’s this constant tension of, we’ve got our Code book, we’ve got 
our rules; this is our play book, and this is our guidebook. But sometimes when 
we’re faced with the practicalities of this melting iceberg of a company, if we 
don’t get it into bankruptcy and if we don’t get a sale, if we don’t get it done, 
all these people are going to lose their jobs and there’s this constant pressure 
and leverage of just the whole thing is going to implode if we don’t make 
something happen. And I think that’s where the rhetoric of this is the lesser of 
two evils really comes into play, and I think a lot of times wins the day or has a 
lot of sway. But to me, thinking about the question is it a victory, I think in 
some ways I’m like, well, maybe there’s an argument it’s not really a victory 
for anyone because it just adds uncertainty into the process. And I think with 
the question of whether it will promote litigation, probably yes, because I think 
you can use it in its narrow holding to stop deals that maybe would have gone 
through otherwise when you got almost all the parties on board or to the table. 
And then I think it also is probably going to promote litigation in the sense of it 
could be expanded into different arenas. 
Katie had mentioned before, other aspects of chapter 11 structured 
dismissals like bells and whistles as we call them, and I think there are a lot of 
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other not-Code-based provisions out there, a lot of other tools that we have in 
our chapter 11 tool belt to get the deal done and things that have developed 
over time that are not really rooted in the Bankruptcy Code itself. Some that 
come to mind are equitable mootness, third party releases, even critical vendor 
payments. To say that these are impermissible, that may be taking a very 
expansive view of Jevic. I think certainly the door is left open for litigants to 
be able to use these tools despite Jevic. 
One thing I think would be interesting is if there ends up being research or 
statistics about how many cases end up citing Jevic, and how much money is 
spent trying to figure out some of these secondary questions. I wonder, in 
comparison to one of the last seminal bankruptcy cases in the Supreme Court, 
the Stern case, where those numbers end up shaking out because I think that 
still—and it’s been way less of a hot topic recently—that took a long time to 
die down. So I wonder if after Jevic, what other related issues may percolate 
up and how many questions it really leaves open. 
MS. FIORENZA: So just a question for you, Alex, is do you think that maybe 
there is a way that this could make bankruptcies cheaper because since in Jevic 
one of the main things was end-of-case distribution and so this will require 
everyone to start settling and coming to agreement a lot sooner, and so maybe 
these chapter 11 bankruptcy cases will run for a shorter period of time? Is there 
an argument for that? 
MS. DUGAN: I think it’s a good question. I think Jevic is definitely a case 
you could very much nerd out on and go down all these different rabbit holes.  
I think that to me is one of the biggest questions I walk away from Jevic with, 
and there’s also mention of what is more of an interim distribution or 
agreement versus a final one. And it’s like what does that mean? Is that more 
of a just, I know it when I see it? Or is it really more like a structured dismissal 
before the end of the case?  
And I think I’m probably jumping ahead a little bit of our program – but I 
think the Fryar case, which I believe was the first case that really dealt with 
Jevic after it was decided, is notable. This was a case in the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Fryar was a case where we had a motion 
to sell and motion to approve a settlement. I think it was about eight months 
into the case so there was not really a lot of indicia that this was going to be a 
successful reorganization. I think in fact they had tried bankruptcy 
unsuccessfully a couple of years before. So there were certain—the red flags 
were going up of like this is probably going the way of liquidation. This is 
probably going the way of a structured dismissal, something like that. But the 
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settlement that was at issue was to sell a piece of property and have the 
proceeds distributed in a way that would violate the priority distributions, in 
particular the IRS was going to get skipped. And several unsecured creditors 
who were scheduled to receive 53 cents on the dollar objected and there was a 
lot of court skepticism that really there was anything better that could get done. 
Ultimately the Court denied the settlement and in a lot of ways was looking to 
Jevic and Jevic’s teachings to do that, and specifically noted, this does not look 
like it’s going the way of a plan, it looks like it’s going more the way of the 
liquidation and in particular that this settlement didn’t serve a Code-related 
objective. And that’s another one that I kind of pondered. I’m like what exactly 
is that going to mean? What are the cases going to tell us that this means? 
MS. GOOD: One of the other things, even before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jevic came down, that was percolating in the bankruptcy 
community is, judges were sometimes approving structured dismissals, but one 
of the judges in Delaware, Judge Carey, would routinely note this is a very 
inelegant way to wrap up your case. And there was a lot of discussion among 
the bar of what can we do to provide a more elegant solution to get to a chapter 
11 plan that might not be as expensive as everyone thinks that it has to be?  
In Delaware there is a big push and there’s a local rule now to allow for a 
combined plan and disclosure statement hearing that would happen a little bit 
more quickly where you would get interim preliminary approval of your 
disclosure statement which in a case that’s liquidating and post-sale, it’s very 
short and sweet. You don’t necessarily have a lot of concerns that you’re not 
disclosing enough information because it’s just simply not a complicated case. 
You set up a solicitation and instead of taking close to 70 days to get to 
confirmation, maybe you take closer to 50. And one of the things that was 
done in the Radio Shack case is the creditors committee said you don’t need to 
solicit our unsecured creditors. You have your impaired accepting classes 
elsewhere. We’re kind of getting the waterfall of whatever comes next, so we 
don’t see a reason for general unsecured creditors to be solicited. And that cut 
down on the solicitation costs a lot in that case.  
So I think one of the things that parties can do and should start thinking 
about doing and have been doing recently is finding a way to get to a plan 
that’s maybe not as expensive as we all think that a traditional plan process has 
to be. 
MS. HAYES: So that’s on the administrative side of things that we can do 
more efficiently to limit costs. But then there are some aspects of Jevic that 
challenge our practitioners in the bankruptcy context on the substantive side. 
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Because with respect to the priority skipping, if that’s a substantive component 
of either your plan or your structured dismissal order, the issue is going to be 
whether or not you have consent. That’s the only thing that the Supreme Court 
left us with in terms of direction. So the question is, do you have consent. But 
what does that mean? That’s not a defined term in the Code. So now you’re 
thinking consent. Well, what will satisfy consent? Could I give negative 
notice? Do I have to actually get all of these creditors to come in that I plan to 
skip? Do I have to bring them to the table? And now I’ve given them a 
position, a seat at the table and that amount of leverage. But then what if they 
refuse to give consent and blow up the entire deal and no one wins? 
And then there’s issues about what satisfies consent. Does it need to be in 
writing? Does it need to just say we go along with this deal? Could it be that 
the unsecured creditors committee could say this is good enough for the 
unsecured creditors, but a particular member of the committee or a particular 
unsecured creditor could say that’s not enough for me and I individually didn’t 
consent? So we still have these substantive issues that are now created as a 
result of this case that kind of interferes with the practitioner’s ability to be 
creative in these difficult scenarios. 
MS. FIORENZA: I’m going to open this question up to the panel, and then 
I’d also love to hear from any of you if you have experience on this as well. 
The question here is, does Jevic signify a shift into further policing the 
Bankruptcy Code and spill over into other chapter 11 practices? For instance, 
have you seen the U.S. Trustee taking a more active role in chapter 11 cases, 
particularly in settlements? Has that been the rule? 
MS. GOOD: I think that the U.S. Trustee’s Office has definitely, when 
settlements are coming together, taken a very close look at them to make sure 
that Jevic isn’t implicated. I know in a recent case we had a settlement in 
connection with a sale that was supposed to get very neatly buttoned up with a 
plan support agreement and a plan confirmation, but as neatly as that’s all 
presented and as well as that seems to be moving down the track, they’re not 
perfectly tied. It’s not as if sale and confirmation will occur exactly together, 
and parties do have rights to either terminate a PSA for certain things or to just 
decide they’re going to breach their obligations. There’s never perfection and 
you can’t guarantee something is going to happen. As the creditors committee, 
we tried to put some language in the sale order that said funds were going to be 
set aside for distribution to general unsecured creditors and the plan would pay 
for admin and priority claims in full, but what was going to be set aside for 
general unsecured creditors could be applied even if the PSA were terminated. 
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We got some pushback from the U.S. Trustee. We had to sort of mold that 
language a little bit more carefully, and now it sort of says that in the event that 
something like that happens the PSA parties will still be bound to support the 
application of those proceeds, rather than an order saying that they can be 
distributed to those unsecured creditors.  
So I think we are seeing the U.S. Trustee taking a close look at settlements 
and seeing whether Jevic is implicated and whether it might be making a 
distribution that calls for priority skipping that would actually be a final 
distribution in the case. 
MS. HAYES: Then outside of settlements I think that we can anticipate seeing 
courts grappling with this issue as it relates to sales and critical vendor 
motions. Anywhere there is going to be an interim payment and the payment is 
going to a party that’s not a first-tier priority claimant, then you can expect 
questions as to whether Jevic is implicated. You should be prepared, if that is 
the case, to demonstrate that you have a Code-based reason for why you are 
proposing this course of action, be it a sale or a payment to a particular critical 
vendor, and then you need to have an explanation of how this process fits into 
your ultimate exit strategy. 
MS. DUGAN: Just a quick note on that. Thinking back to our discussion about 
what makes bankruptcy expensive and why is it so expensive, and is it really 
that expensive, I do think that some of the uncertainties from Jevic and if there 
is really a shifting role and the UST taking a more active role and/or other 
parties objecting, I think that not so much even expense but just the uncertainty 
of litigation. And sometimes along with that uncertainty it’s really hard to 
predict what the ultimate costs are going to be at the beginning of a case 
because especially when the landscape is shifting in terms of where the case 
law may be on some of these issues, it’s challenging to predict what the cost 
may be. 
MS. FIORENZA: And I will say that we’ve been told in our district here that 
it is an absolute priority for the U.S. Trustee. Any time there is a motion with 
priority skipping towards the end of the case the U.S. Trustee is absolutely 
required from his top boss down to object. That’s whether there are other 
parties objecting or not, the U.S. Trustee will be objecting. So that’s kind of in 
our experience. Does anyone else have any experience they would like to share 
with us? You don’t have to be shy. Please. 
[Inaudible comment or question from audience] 
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MS. HAYES: It matters. It goes back from my perspective. It’s not that I have 
any rationale beyond the fact that the WARN Act is literally sacrosanct, and so 
it’s a federal statute. If you’re going to juxtapose one federal statute against 
another, then you’re going to have to have a very good reason of why you are 
causing or interjecting the two. And so absent some type of foresight and 
preparation for the WARN Act claims and dealing with them at the table, after 
the fact their claim is what it is, and it’s a WARN Act. So mind you, you’re 
also putting into the context the conflict between the overall perspective of the 
Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy judges over other Article III judges and what 
they can do to claims. And so those are issues that you’re creating in your own 
case if you go run afoul of the WARN Act. Because now you’re asking a 
bankruptcy judge to not only quiet or quell a right, now it’s a federal right that 
you’re asking the bankruptcy judge to allow you to extinguish through a 
bankruptcy process that’s not even a bankruptcy plan. It’s just something that 
you wrote outside in the hallway and now you’re asking the bankruptcy judge 
to say, hey, it’s okay. The WARN Act thing that Congress passed, uh, no big 
deal. We went outside in the hallway and struck up something else that we 
think works better. So that’s the issue to me, it comes down to how far you can 
go in bankruptcy court. It comes to the whole idea about what perception 
people have about collusion and deal striking and what goes on in bankruptcy. 
MS. GOOD: I think to counter that a little bit, one of the real struggles that I 
think that debtors and lenders and creditors’ committees deal with and what 
made structured dismissals attractive in some scenarios is the ease with which 
you can negotiate with certain parties in a case. It is not always easy to 
negotiate with WARN claimants, in part because they’re a class, in part 
because they know that they have this federal right. The other party that it’s not 
easy to negotiate with that often gets pulled in to these situations is the IRS. 
They’re not a party that comes to the negotiating table. And if you do try to 
engage in those negotiations, they are very slow. It requires a lot of up-the-
chain approvals and down-the-chain responses, and it takes months, and it’s 
just not something that is going to be a quick and efficient out. I think that’s 
why parties have turned to structured dismissals in part. It’s not because 
they’re necessarily seeking always to exclude a certain class but because they 
look at it and they say, well, there’s really no hope of us getting around this, so 
let’s go strike our own deal and see what we can do. 
MS. DUGAN: And then just to echo on that, in the Fryar case that I talked 
about a little bit before, the IRS was not a party that objected to it, and that was 
the party that was being skipped. So I think that from a practical perspective 
sometimes, I tend to a lot of times like the practical arguments more than the 
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well-the-Code-says-this arguments and that’s just maybe my personality, but I 
struggle sometimes to say but we’re so close, if we’re this close, is there one 
party that’s going to hold this up or that pesky Code section that’s going to 
hold it up. Although I know there are a lot of counterarguments to that. 
MS. HAYES: The other thing I would pose to the audience is the shifting of 
tides from the past Supreme Court to the current Supreme Court, with the 
current Supreme Court being more textualist and wanting to stick so close to 
the text of the Code before relief can be granted. Then juxtaposing that against 
the equity that bankruptcy courts are charged with pursuing, and oftentimes the 
need in order to strike equity is to be creative and efficient and move outside of 
what the Code says and rely on the spirit of the Code in fashioning resolutions, 
and can you continue to do that in various areas of bankruptcy practice in light 
of the fact that a lot of the relief that we seek “for cause,” is not Code-based. 
And can you rely on the order that you receive from a bankruptcy judge for 
cause not being challenged all the way up to the Supreme Court? 
MS. DUGAN: Like if you just throw 105(a) in your brief, will that cure it? 
MS. HAYES: There was a day, but that day has long gone. 
MS. DUGAN: Not anymore. 
MS. FIORENZA: So, are we saying that Jevic no longer allows for priority 
skipping? 
MS. HAYES: The Court didn’t go that far. You can have structured 
dismissals, you can have priority skipping. What you need is consent. Again, 
we don’t know what that consent means, and whose consent would be 
sufficient. The Court didn’t go that far to delineate, so I think in the priority 
skipping context, then you need to try to identify the parties, the claimants with 
the most leverage in terms of priorities and bring them to the table. It may be 
staggered, it may be over time, but you have to have at least accounted for 
them in your presentation before you get in front of the Court, because the 
judges will be reticent to grant that relief absent your showing of consent.  
And then secondly, absent your showing of evidence to support the plan or 
the deal that you have struck is Code-based, it needs to relate back to substance 
that you can find in the Code for what you’re planning to move forward with. 
MS. GOOD: I think the other avenue where there’s still potential for priority 
skipping is where the Supreme Court has a whole paragraph where it kind of 
goes into dicta talking about, well, interim distributions that serve Code-related 
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objectives can violate the ordinary priority rules as long as they’re not attached 
to a final distribution and they’re serving a significant offsetting bankruptcy 
justification. And that paragraph was really going to things like critical vendor 
payments, certain employee wage payments, and things like that, that you 
would see in first day orders under the doctrine of necessity. 
So you still have an avenue potentially, and there can be a lot of litigation 
that surrounds what is a Code-related objective or significant offsetting 
bankruptcy justification, and at what point does an interim distribution become 
attached to a final distribution? But there’s still potential for payments in those 
settings, and I think one of the things that you might see more and more of, and 
we’ve certainly seen some of it to date, is debtors and lenders who say, okay, 
I’m going to take control of this case and I’m coming in. I know I want to buy 
the company. I’m going to make sure I pay all the critical trade, and then I 
won’t have a committee. If I can get that done in the first 14 or so days of the 
case, I won’t have a committee, and then I can just kind of run, and we’ll see 
when all these priority and admin claims actually show up, if they actually 
show up. Because a lot of them, notwithstanding being served with a sale 
motion, just aren’t responding as quickly in the case. So there is potential for 
quite a bit of litigation there. I think we’re seeing the U.S. Trustee raising some 
objections on critical vendor motions and really putting the debtor to their 
burden to show that those vendors are truly critical and necessary for ongoing 
operations, and if they don’t get paid they’re really not going to ship going 
forward, or not going to ship on the terms that are necessary to keep the debtor 
afloat. 
MS. FIORENZA: I guess that raises two interesting questions, and the first is 
to the critical vendors. Did Jevic change critical vendor? Did it make it more 
stringent? More relaxed? Or is it just as it was before the Jevic opinion came 
down? 
MS. GOOD: In my experience we’re still seeing critical vendor motions. 
We’re still seeing a lot of critical vendor payments being approved. It’s just a 
matter of burden of proof. And it’s the U.S. Trustee telling the debtor, this isn’t 
solved until you put your case on, and the judge takes in the evidence. So 
they’re still out there, but I think that they’re just eyed with a new lens post-
Jevic. 
MS. FIORENZA: So what about gift plans? Has Jevic changed those or taken 
those off the table? I’ll raise that to any of you all. 
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MS. HAYES: I don’t know that Jevic has taken it off the table. I think that it’s 
really a continuation of the same discussion in terms of what type of 
presentation the practitioners will have to make in order to approve such a 
plan. 
MS. DUGAN: Going back to one of the earliest comments on the dissent and 
what was actually the difference between the question on cert and the question 
that the parties briefed, that’s one in particular that I think could have had a 
very different answer if we had gone with the original question which just 
more generally referenced settlement proceeds whereas what got briefed was 
estate property. 
MS. GOOD: And whether you can still have gifting and priority skipping, in 
the context of gifting I think is still very much an open issue. It’s one that’s 
being litigated right now in the Constellation case. For full disclosure, my firm 
represents the committee in that case, so we are arguing that. These are my 
views and not those of my clients.  
But in that case, the debtor sold their assets to one of the secured lender’s 
newly formed acquisition vehicles through a credit bid, and in connection with 
that sale the committee negotiated for a trust. And what would be contributed 
to that trust from the secured lender was some cash, and the chapter 5 causes of 
action that the purchaser had purchased in the asset sale. So the settlement got 
structured between when the—I think it was between when the Third Circuit 
opinion came out, but it might have been a little bit before that—when the 
settlement got structured, Jevic was still a decision that said, yes, structured 
dismissals are good, and then cert got granted while this is up. And the 
bankruptcy judge said, you know what, I don’t need to decide this until we see 
what the Supreme Court is going to do. So it literally went on hold, and then 
was argued and briefed before the bankruptcy court after the Jevic decision 
came down. And the issue there is really whether a case called ICL, out of the 
Third Circuit, applied and not Jevic. And ICL is a decision out of the Third 
Circuit where the holding was basically that the Code’s distribution rules don’t 
apply to non-estate property. 
In ICL, the debtor was a series of healthcare centers. They failed, they ran a 
sale process, they got some offers, none of them were close to clearing the 
secured debt, and just really weren’t acceptable offers in the view of the 
debtors, so ultimately it proceeds by sale by credit bid to the lenders. The 
government objected because the sale would have created by its own closing a 
$24 million admin tax claim and there would be no funds left in the estate to 
pay it. 
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Also in connection with this sale, the creditors committee reached a deal 
with the purchaser whereby those lenders who were not paying cash—this 
wasn’t like they were taking a cash portion of their bid—they were bidding all 
credit bid, and they just took $3.5 million of the cash and created a general 
unsecured creditors trust. The bankruptcy court approved that settlement and 
then the Third Circuit said when you have secured lenders using their own 
funds to pay general unsecured creditors, we can’t say that those are estate 
monies. They aren’t the proceeds of their liens. They didn’t become part of the 
estate even as a pass-through. They separately went into a separate trust 
account. They never became part of the estate, were never transferred through 
debtor accounts. They said those assets actually never belonged to the debtor’s 
estate. So they said that priority scheme isn’t an issue and the settlement is 
fine.  
So the question in Constellation is, what applies? Does Jevic apply? And 
does ICL apply? And I guess factually there is some question of whether these 
causes of action are, as our opponents say, were laundered through the sale 
process. So that was argued before the district court. Oral argument was 
February 11, so that’s under advisement. It’ll be interesting to see how the 
district court rules on whether you can still have gifting and distribution of 
non-estate assets, if these are non-estate assets, outside of the context of the 
Code’s priorities. 
MS. FIORENZA: Because I want to open this up to any questions you all 
may have, I do want to mention that we didn’t get to everything we wanted to 
discuss today. So there is still horizontal priority skipping, which there’s a case 
decided on that. And then also what’s happening right now in the Jevic 
bankruptcy case. And so our materials go over both of those issues and other 
issues. So I would encourage you to look at those. 
Then, on that, does anyone have any questions? Any thoughts they would 
like to discuss? We’d love to hear from you. 
[Inaudible comment or question from audience] 
MS. FIORENZA: Just to be fair, all three courts, bankruptcy, district and 
Third, were hesitant to approve the structured dismissal settlement, although I 
think bankruptcy and then district and then Third Circuit stepped up the ladder 
for concern, Concern-wise, the Third Circuit certainly expressed the most 
concern out of those three courts. That’s just to be fair. I think I cut someone 
off. 
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MS. HAYES: I was going to say, I guess the creative narrative. Generally, 
because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, they subscribe to the priority 
scheme as their preference. And so that is what they thought was what should 
have been done. The issue was the priority scheme is required to be followed 
in the context of a plan. These guys are not moving forward with the plan, so 
you’re comparing the rules of basketball to football. And they’re saying, hey, 
well, this is football and I can dribble all I want and not incur a penalty even 
though I’m dribbling the football which in another world would cause a 
penalty. In football, I can do it. And so they did it and the bankruptcy bourt 
thought, I don’t like this, but the rule that I would impose or enforce in order to 
stop you from doing this does not apply. 
So I think in that sense, looking at the way bankruptcy is used to strike 
equity, the judge understood on a base level that they could do it. They were 
creative. The Code allows them, and the practice allows them, to be creative. 
That’s fine. The district court respected that. The Third Circuit respected that. I 
think going back to textualism and the process, so that was the conflict 
between the majority at the Supreme Court being textualists and the dissent 
being focused on the process. Meaning you can’t change the question in the 
last inning, and that is what happened, so Justice Thomas our Circuit Justice 
thought, no, and Justice Alito thought no, you can’t change the question. We 
want to stick to and make sure that any process is correct before we resolve the 
issue. The majority thought we want to make sure that you are looking at the 
text and focusing on the text in every resolution that you create in the 
bankruptcy process. And so that’s where we kind of have a disconnect. 
I don’t know that either is wrong. I tend to lean towards the dissent because 
it is something similar to every other process that has been pushed through and 
become a norm in the bankruptcy context. You need more time, and it needs to 
be filtered through more circuits, more decisions, more thoughtful practitioners 
and judges and thought leaders having enough time to chew on this issue and 
figuring out where to strike the balance between equity and efficiency. So that 
is why I would agree with the dissent that you should have given it more time 
for this to play out amongst the courts and let the people that do this every day 
figure out the best way to handle it. 
MS. DUGAN: And I think that can be one of the challenges sometimes when 
bankruptcy cases go up. No means for any disrespect, but I think that the folks 
who deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis and are the experts and 
thought leaders in their field and the judges and practitioners who deal with 
these issues can understand and just see more easily some of the downstream 
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effects it can have, and even when deciding a very narrow issue if some may 
have implications in other arenas. 
MS. GOOD: I think the one critical thing that comes out if you actually read 
all opinions is if it tells you where the Supreme Court thought differently than 
the lower courts, the Supreme Court says, well, they could find someone to 
pursue—a chapter 7 trustee could find someone to pursue—these causes of 
action on a contingency. And the bankruptcy court said, if there’s anyone here 
who’s going to do that without any of their expenses being paid, without 
money to hire an expert, he actually said something along the lines of, they 
should have their head examined. 
I think there was just a disconnect there. I mean in theory, yes, a chapter 7 
trustee could’ve gone out and found someone to pursue that on a contingency, 
but being in a firm that does contingency work from time to time, if you don’t 
have money to pay expenses and you don’t have a million dollars for an expert, 
it’s very hard to pursue certain causes of action on a contingency. 
MS. HAYES: I guess that harkens back to the morning program when there 
was a discussion about Midland Funding and the resolution that the Court 
prescribed of, oh, yeah, you know what, the trustees can do this investigation. 
They have the time, they have nothing to do. But the practicalities of it make it 
difficult. 
The other issue is that this has lent more credibility to the concept of 
litigation funding in the bankruptcy context and, having also represented a 
good deal of creditors’ committees as well as trustees in bankruptcy litigation, 
it is quite expensive and for the most part my firm does it on a contingency fee 
basis, and there are risks that are borne on either side.  
The concern I have about introducing litigation funding into this context is 
for the actual creditors because I would tell my trustee client, even though I 
may have some bias because I’m counsel and so that litigation funding may cut 
into my profit margins candidly. But also the issue is whether you’re actually 
serving the creditors. Because I say the same thing that I say to my startup 
clients, there’s no free money. So you’re getting litigation financing but the 
cost of that financing, you actually don’t know what that’s going to be until 
you receive a recovery. And that’s in addition to the cost of the litigation, 
meaning in addition to the cost that you’re going to pay for counsel anywhere 
between 18%, 33%, sometimes 40%. Then you’re going to pay your expenses. 
Now you’re going to pay the interest and the fees on the litigation financing. 
And that may still be fine with the trustee or the committee, but then what 
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about the individual creditors that are sometimes getting 5, 10 and in very 
extreme circumstances 70, 80  cents on the dollar. You add into that the cost of 
the litigation financing, is it really worth it at that point? 
MS. FIORENZA: I think we had one other question, in the far back. 
[Inaudible question from audience] 
MS. HAYES: I have not seen it, but if I were to see it and I was representing 
the committee, and wasn’t a part of that 363 plan, I have a case right now that a 
363 sale is being proposed, and I raised the issue with the debtor’s counsel and 
counsel for the lender because we weren’t at the table when this deal was 
struck, and I raised the Jevic issue. So it’s open for challenge even in the 363 
context. It’s also open, like we said before, in the critical vendor. So I don’t 
think that a 363 is going to be the answer to Jevic. That’s just another 
opportunity for a Jevic challenge. 
MS. DUGAN: And that was, again harkening back to the Fryar case, it was a 
363 sale in that one, a much smaller chapter 11 case. 
MS. FIORENZA: Any other questions? Thank you again for listening. 
MR. MAHER: Thanks again to our Corporate Panel. Thank you all for 
coming. We hope you will join us for lunch we have set up right outside. 
Please don’t forget your bags or parking vouchers. Thank you so much. 
 
